

## **An Internet Appendix to “Foreign Institutional Ownership and the Global Convergence of Financial Reporting Practices”**

This Appendix reports supplemental analyses for “Foreign Institutional Ownership and the Global Convergence of Financial Reporting Practices,” with the content summarized as follows:

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## Definition Table:

| Variable Name                           | Definition   |
|---|--|
| $DIVIDEND_{t+1}$                        | An indicator variable that equals one if a firm pays a dividend in year $t+1$ , and zero otherwise;  |
| $POST2003\_TaxTreaty_t$                 | An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is domiciled in a country that has an eligible tax treaty with the U.S. under the JGTRRA Act of 2003 in year $t$ , and zero otherwise;   |
| $US\_OWN\_FLOAT_t$                      | Fraction of a firm's free-float held by U.S. mutual funds at the end of year $t$ ;   |
| $CORR\_RET_t$                           | The cross-sectional average of Pearson correlation coefficients between a non-U.S. firm's annual stock returns and its U.S. industry peers' annual stock returns, calculated over year $t-4$ to $t$ ;  |
| $CORR\_CFO_t$                           | The cross-sectional average of Pearson correlation coefficients between a non-U.S. firm's cash flows and its U.S. industry peers' cash flows, calculated over year $t-4$ to $t$ ;  |
| $BETA_t$                                | Return co-movement, calculated over year $t-4$ to $t$ by regressing a non-U.S. firm's monthly stock returns on the Datastream U.S. market index returns;   |
| $ASSETTURN_t$                           | Asset turnover, calculated as sales divided by total assets at the end of year $t$ ;   |
| $FSALES_t$                              | Fraction of a firm's total sales to foreign countries in year $t$ ;  |
| $OPCYCLE_t$                             | Operating cycle, calculated as the sum of accounts receivable and inventory over sales, multiplied by 360 days and scaled by 1,000 at the end of year $t$ ;  |
| $SALES\_GR_{t-1\ to\ t}$                | Sales growth, calculated as the increase in sales from year $t-1$ to $t$ scaled by sales in year $t-1$ ;   |
| $INITIATION_t$                          | An indicator variable that equals one if a firm's U.S. mutual fund ownership changes from zero to positive in year $t$ , and zero otherwise;   |
| $\Delta COMP\_UK_{t\ to\ t+1}$          | Change in $COMP\_UK$ from year $t$ to $t+1$ , in percentage points. $COMP\_UK$ is the measure of the reporting comparability between a non-U.K. firm and its U.K. industry peers, adapted from De Franco et al. [2011]. $\Delta COMP\_UK_{t\ to\ t+1}$ is $COMP\_UK_{t+1}$ minus $COMP\_UK_t$ , where $COMP\_UK_t$ is estimated from year $t-4$ to $t$ and $COMP\_UK_{t+1}$ from year $t-3$ to $t+1$ ; |
| $UK\_OWN_t$                             | Fraction of a firm's shares held by U.K. mutual funds at the end of year $t$ ;   |
| $NONUS\_OWN_t$                          | Fraction of a firm's shares held by non-U.S. foreign mutual funds at the end of year $t$ ;   |
| $US\_BLKOWN_t$<br>( $US\_NONBLKOWN_t$ ) | Fraction of a firm's shares held by U.S. mutual funds that own 5% or more (less than 5%), at the end of year $t$ ;   |
| $US\_LTOWN_t$<br>( $US\_STOWN_t$ )      | Fraction of a firm's shares held by U.S. mutual funds who own the shares for one year or longer (less than one year), at the end of year $t$ .   |

**Table IA1 – Sample distribution by industry-year within emerging and developed markets**

|                          | 1998  | 1999  | 2000  | 2001  | 2002  | 2003  | 2004  | 2005  | 2006  | 2007  | 2008  | 2009  | Total  |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| <i>Emerging Markets</i>  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |
| Basic Materials          | 291   | 311   | 340   | 424   | 601   | 670   | 696   | 720   | 750   | 788   | 817   | 839   | 7,247  |
| Consumer Goods           | 453   | 487   | 556   | 670   | 898   | 1,021 | 1,081 | 1,119 | 1,156 | 1,228 | 1,260 | 1,189 | 11,118 |
| Consumer Services        | 151   | 169   | 213   | 261   | 399   | 437   | 446   | 454   | 471   | 504   | 507   | 462   | 4,474  |
| Financials               | 326   | 352   | 405   | 492   | 615   | 701   | 723   | 764   | 788   | 862   | 882   | 852   | 7,762  |
| Health Care              | 54    | 57    | 74    | 99    | 174   | 200   | 212   | 229   | 240   | 261   | 275   | 274   | 2,149  |
| Industrials              | 447   | 488   | 538   | 668   | 977   | 1,160 | 1,234 | 1,318 | 1,416 | 1,517 | 1,556 | 1,493 | 12,812 |
| Oil & Gas                | 33    | 39    | 44    | 46    | 63    | 66    | 72    | 73    | 74    | 84    | 84    | 84    | 762    |
| Technology               | 66    | 85    | 98    | 161   | 239   | 295   | 335   | 365   | 403   | 430   | 431   | 442   | 3,350  |
| Telecommunications       | 23    | 34    | 33    | 44    | 43    | 54    | 59    | 59    | 60    | 60    | 59    | 53    | 581    |
| Utilities                | 34    | 38    | 46    | 65    | 127   | 152   | 153   | 134   | 159   | 164   | 167   | 107   | 1,346  |
| Total                    | 1,878 | 2,060 | 2,347 | 2,930 | 4,136 | 4,756 | 5,011 | 5,235 | 5,517 | 5,898 | 6,038 | 5,795 | 51,601 |
| <i>Developed Markets</i> |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |
| Basic Materials          | 569   | 556   | 592   | 626   | 678   | 788   | 839   | 886   | 915   | 997   | 1,042 | 1,045 | 9,533  |
| Consumer Goods           | 1,031 | 1,017 | 1,062 | 1,073 | 1,105 | 1,167 | 1,168 | 1,171 | 1,168 | 1,179 | 1,149 | 1,115 | 13,405 |
| Consumer Services        | 729   | 772   | 819   | 879   | 932   | 1,044 | 1,077 | 1,061 | 1,051 | 1,070 | 1,082 | 1,065 | 11,581 |
| Financials               | 986   | 973   | 964   | 999   | 1,045 | 1,136 | 1,177 | 1,230 | 1,250 | 1,278 | 1,307 | 1,294 | 13,639 |
| Health Care              | 166   | 196   | 230   | 265   | 290   | 342   | 390   | 396   | 398   | 441   | 462   | 444   | 4,020  |
| Industrials              | 1,756 | 1,742 | 1,817 | 1,886 | 1,945 | 2,042 | 2,110 | 2,130 | 2,133 | 2,122 | 2,169 | 2,124 | 23,976 |
| Oil & Gas                | 113   | 117   | 139   | 163   | 205   | 249   | 270   | 286   | 301   | 335   | 369   | 377   | 2,924  |
| Technology               | 262   | 299   | 381   | 456   | 584   | 802   | 880   | 896   | 911   | 899   | 900   | 835   | 8,105  |
| Telecommunications       | 33    | 35    | 41    | 48    | 47    | 62    | 72    | 71    | 64    | 65    | 83    | 71    | 692    |
| Utilities                | 60    | 63    | 60    | 59    | 97    | 127   | 133   | 105   | 104   | 99    | 93    | 51    | 1,051  |
| Total                    | 5,705 | 5,770 | 6,105 | 6,454 | 6,928 | 7,759 | 8,116 | 8,232 | 8,295 | 8,485 | 8,656 | 8,421 | 88,926 |

This table reports sample distribution by industry-year, separately for emerging and developed markets. Emerging and developed markets are identified using the MSCI Barra classifications. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009.

**Table IA2 – Descriptive statistics for the main variables within the sample of U.S. firms**

| Variable                                     | N      | Mean   | SD    | 5%     | 25%    | Median | 75%    | 95%    |
|--|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| <i>U.S. Industry Peers of Non-U.S. Firms</i> |        |        |       |        |        |        |        |        |
| <i>COMP_US<sub>t+1</sub></i>                 | 41,729 | -13.65 | 6.615 | -25.79 | -16.56 | -12.75 | -8.956 | -5.584 |
| <i>ΔCOMP_US<sub>t to t+1</sub></i>           | 41,729 | -0.337 | 2.913 | -4.208 | -1.283 | -0.213 | 0.588  | 3.411  |
| <i>US_OWN<sub>t</sub></i>                    | 41,729 | 0.177  | 0.138 | 0.005  | 0.049  | 0.157  | 0.280  | 0.422  |
| <i>SIZE<sub>t</sub></i>                      | 41,729 | 12.94  | 2.008 | 9.820  | 11.48  | 12.87  | 14.26  | 16.42  |
| <i>BM<sub>t</sub></i>                        | 41,729 | 0.690  | 0.677 | 0.126  | 0.323  | 0.531  | 0.825  | 1.741  |
| <i>ROA<sub>t</sub></i>                       | 41,729 | 0.020  | 0.144 | -0.251 | 0.008  | 0.041  | 0.082  | 0.171  |
| <i>RETVOL<sub>t</sub></i>                    | 41,729 | 0.467  | 0.333 | 0.145  | 0.255  | 0.386  | 0.581  | 1.039  |
| <i>AGE<sub>t</sub></i>                       | 41,729 | 16.19  | 9.847 | 4.000  | 8.000  | 13.00  | 25.00  | 34.00  |
| <i>CH<sub>t</sub></i>                        | 41,729 | 0.245  | 0.214 | 0.004  | 0.069  | 0.191  | 0.367  | 0.679  |

This table reports the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 5<sup>th</sup> percentile (5%), 25<sup>th</sup> percentile (25%), median, 75<sup>th</sup> percentile (75%), and 95<sup>th</sup> percentile (95%) for the variables used in our primary analyses, for the sample from which we select U.S. industry peers in calculating the comparability to U.S. firms of non-U.S. firms. The variables include the adapted DKV measure of non-U.S. firms' reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers (*COMP\_US*), one-year change in comparability (*ΔCOMP\_US*), U.S. mutual fund ownership (*US\_OWN*), the logarithm of market capitalization (*SIZE*), book-to-market ratio (*BM*), return-on-assets ratio (*ROA*), stock return volatility (*RETVOL*), an indicator variable for cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange (*ADR*), firm age (*AGE*), and closely held ownership (*CH*). Prefix *Δ* denotes the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.

**Table IA3 – Correlation matrix of the main variables within emerging and developed markets**

| Pearson                           | (1)      | (2)      | (3)      | (4)      | (5)      | (6)      | (7)      | (8)      | (9)      |
|-----------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Spearman                          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>Emerging Markets</b>           |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| (1) <i>COMP_US</i> <sub>t+1</sub> |          | 0.03*    | 0.22***  | -0.06    | 0.09***  | -0.29*** | 0.00     | 0.12***  | 0.01     |
| (2) <i>US_OWN</i> <sub>t</sub>    | 0.11***  |          | 0.31***  | -0.09**  | 0.08***  | -0.05**  | 0.12**   | 0.09**   | -0.04    |
| (3) <i>SIZE</i> <sub>t</sub>      | 0.23***  | 0.56***  |          | -0.38*** | 0.24***  | -0.23*** | 0.28***  | 0.29***  | 0.02***  |
| (4) <i>BM</i> <sub>t</sub>        | 0.03*    | -0.07    | -0.41*** |          | -0.08*** | 0.05***  | -0.08*** | 0.03**   | 0.01*    |
| (5) <i>ROA</i> <sub>t</sub>       | -0.07*** | 0.11***  | 0.23***  | -0.24*** |          | -0.21*** | 0.00     | 0.03*    | 0.07***  |
| (6) <i>RETVOL</i> <sub>t</sub>    | -0.35*** | -0.13*** | -0.23*** | -0.01    | -0.17*** |          | -0.02*   | -0.15*** | -0.03    |
| (7) <i>ADR</i> <sub>t</sub>       | -0.01    | 0.12***  | 0.22***  | -0.10*** | 0.02     | -0.02    |          | 0.07***  | -0.07*** |
| (8) <i>AGE</i> <sub>t</sub>       | 0.11***  | 0.28***  | 0.23***  | 0.12***  | -0.05    | -0.18*** | 0.05**   |          | 0.02*    |
| (9) <i>CH</i> <sub>t</sub>        | 0.01     | 0.06***  | 0.06***  | 0.03     | 0.07***  | -0.05*   | -0.06*** | 0.06*    |          |
| Pearson                           | (1)      | (2)      | (3)      | (4)      | (5)      | (6)      | (7)      | (8)      | (9)      |
| Spearman                          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>Developed Markets</b>          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| (1) <i>COMP_US</i> <sub>t+1</sub> |          | 0.05**   | 0.26***  | 0.01*    | 0.21***  | -0.34*** | 0.00     | 0.17***  | 0.02     |
| (2) <i>US_OWN</i> <sub>t</sub>    | -0.04*   |          | 0.33***  | -0.10*** | 0.09**   | -0.06*   | 0.11**   | 0.08**   | -0.06**  |
| (3) <i>SIZE</i> <sub>t</sub>      | 0.16***  | 0.44***  |          | -0.32*** | 0.26***  | -0.26*** | 0.29***  | 0.36***  | 0.01**   |
| (4) <i>BM</i> <sub>t</sub>        | -0.09*   | -0.03**  | -0.54*** |          | -0.07    | 0.02*    | -0.09*** | 0.02*    | 0.02*    |
| (5) <i>ROA</i> <sub>t</sub>       | -0.18*** | 0.13***  | 0.22***  | -0.25*** |          | -0.29*** | 0.00     | 0.08*    | 0.08***  |
| (6) <i>RETVOL</i> <sub>t</sub>    | -0.23*** | -0.02*   | -0.13*** | 0.02     | -0.13**  |          | -0.01    | -0.17*** | -0.01**  |
| (7) <i>ADR</i> <sub>t</sub>       | -0.01    | 0.18***  | 0.21***  | -0.07*   | 0.03     | -0.06*   |          | 0.09***  | -0.12*** |
| (8) <i>AGE</i> <sub>t</sub>       | -0.10**  | 0.20***  | -0.02    | 0.20***  | -0.02**  | 0.01     | 0.00     |          | -0.02    |
| (9) <i>CH</i> <sub>t</sub>        | -0.04    | 0.13**   | 0.05**   | 0.05     | 0.09**   | -0.04    | 0.02     | 0.10*    |          |

This table reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlations between the measure of non-U.S. firms' reporting comparability to U.S. industry peers (*COMP\_US*), U.S. mutual fund ownership (*US\_OWN*), and controls, separately for emerging and developed markets. Controls include the logarithm of market capitalization (*SIZE*), book-to-market ratio (*BM*), return-on-assets ratio (*ROA*), stock return volatility (*RETVOL*), an indicator variable for cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange (*ADR*), firm age (*AGE*), and closely held ownership (*CH*). Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are reported above (below) the main diagonal. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA4 – Robustness checks lagging U.S. ownership and controls by one more year**

*Panel A: Changes-on-levels specifications*

| Dependent Variables     | (1)   | (2)   | (3)                                   | (4)   | (5)   | (6)  |
|-------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|---|--|
|                         | <b>Pooled Sample</b><br>$\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | <b>Developed Markets</b><br>$\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | <b>Emerging Markets</b><br>$\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$<br>$Q_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$<br>$AS_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$<br>$CFO_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ |
| $US\_OWN_{t-1}$         | <b>0.322</b><br>(0.293)                                       | <b>0.107</b><br>(0.349)   | <b>0.967*</b><br>(0.544)              | <b>0.365*</b><br>(0.213)  | <b>1.169*</b><br>(0.578)  | <b>0.804**</b><br>(0.370)  |
| $SIZE_{t-1}$            | 0.010<br>(0.007)  | -0.004<br>(0.008)   | 0.050***<br>(0.014)                   | 0.023***<br>(0.009)   | 0.016<br>(0.017)  | 0.006<br>(0.012)   |
| $BM_{t-1}$              | -0.391***<br>(0.017)  | -0.338***<br>(0.021)  | -0.419***<br>(0.027)                  | -0.049**<br>(0.021)   | -0.452***<br>(0.033)  | -0.254***<br>(0.028)   |
| $ROA_{t-1}$             | 0.175<br>(0.126)  | 0.068<br>(0.143)  | 0.934***<br>(0.285)                   | 0.572***<br>(0.198)   | 1.476***<br>(0.338)   | 0.702***<br>(0.230)  |
| $RETVOL_{t-1}$          | 0.067<br>(0.048)  | 0.076<br>(0.065)  | 0.137*<br>(0.071)                     | 0.216***<br>(0.050)   | 0.078<br>(0.086)  | 0.047<br>(0.050)   |
| $ADR_{t-1}$             | -0.100*<br>(0.053)  | -0.073<br>(0.061)   | -0.141<br>(0.107)                     | -0.053<br>(0.067)   | 0.041<br>(0.131)  | -0.137<br>(0.087)  |
| $AGE_{t-1}$             | 0.002<br>(0.001)  | -0.001<br>(0.001)   | 0.026***<br>(0.004)                   | 0.016***<br>(0.002)   | 0.029***<br>(0.004)   | 0.018***<br>(0.003)  |
| $CH_{t-1}$              | 0.021<br>(0.038)  | -0.112**<br>(0.046)   | 0.094<br>(0.068)                      | -0.017<br>(0.042)   | 0.128<br>(0.078)  | 0.004<br>(0.053)   |
| Year FE                 | Yes   | Yes   | Yes                                   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes  |
| Industry FE             | Yes   | Yes   | Yes                                   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes  |
| Country FE              | Yes   | Yes   | Yes                                   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes  |
| # of Obs.               | 130,340   | 82,182  | 48,158                                | 27,789  | 36,097  | 34,543   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.0786  | 0.0760  | 0.0895                                | 0.1291  | 0.1334  | 0.0961   |

**Table IA4 – Continued**

*Panel B: Changes-on-changes specifications*

| Dependent Variables                    | (1)  | (2)  | (3)                                   | (4) Emerging Markets                     |   |  |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|--|---|--|
|  | Pooled Sample<br>$\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | Developed Markets<br>$\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP\_US_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP\_US\_Q_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP\_US\_AS_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP\_US\_CFO_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ |
| $\Delta US\_OWN_{t-2 \text{ to } t-1}$ | <b>1.022<sup>***</sup></b><br>(0.326)                  | <b>0.606</b><br>(0.372)                                    | <b>1.639<sup>**</sup></b><br>(0.590)  | <b>0.654<sup>***</sup></b><br>(0.202)    | <b>1.668<sup>**</sup></b><br>(0.621)      | <b>1.176<sup>***</sup></b><br>(0.371)      |
| $\Delta SIZE_{t-2 \text{ to } t-1}$    | 0.186 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.030)                        | 0.180 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.039)                             | 0.238 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.049)        | 0.099 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.025)           | 0.146 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.054)            | 0.180 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.036)             |
| $\Delta BM_{t-2 \text{ to } t-1}$      | -0.011<br>(0.029)                                      | 0.017<br>(0.038)   | -0.025<br>(0.042)                     | -0.067 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.025)          | -0.165 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.045)           | -0.043<br>(0.038)                          |
| $\Delta ROA_{t-2 \text{ to } t-1}$     | 0.032<br>(0.141)                                       | 0.206<br>(0.158)   | -0.739 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.320)       | -0.224<br>(0.166)                        | -0.890 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.404)           | -0.572 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.244)            |
| $\Delta RETVOL_{t-2 \text{ to } t-1}$  | -0.247 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.040)                       | -0.284 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.056)                           | -0.209 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.057)      | -0.016<br>(0.032)                        | -0.309 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.066)          | -0.044<br>(0.042)                          |
| $\Delta ADR_{t-2 \text{ to } t-1}$     | 0.314 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.183)                          | 0.282<br>(0.208)   | 0.340<br>(0.388)                      | 0.161<br>(0.253)                         | 0.521<br>(0.533)                          | 0.582<br>(0.412)                           |
| $\Delta CH_{t-2 \text{ to } t-1}$      | 0.110<br>(0.072)                                       | 0.100<br>(0.089)   | 0.121<br>(0.122)                      | -0.065<br>(0.069)                        | -0.050<br>(0.131)                         | -0.097<br>(0.093)                          |
| Year FE                                | Yes  | Yes  | Yes                                   | Yes                                      | Yes                                       | Yes  |
| Industry FE                            | Yes  | Yes  | Yes                                   | Yes                                      | Yes                                       | Yes  |
| Country FE                             | Yes  | Yes  | Yes                                   | Yes                                      | Yes                                       | Yes  |
| # of Obs.                              | 116,621  | 73,916   | 42,705                                | 25,973                                   | 33,368                                    | 32,232                                     |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>                | 0.0665   | 0.0690   | 0.0676                                | 0.1305                                   | 0.1196                                    | 0.0885                                     |

Panel A [Panel B] of this table reports the ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression results on the relation between the *levels* of U.S. mutual fund ownership (*US\_OWN*) in year *t-1* [the *changes* in U.S. mutual fund ownership from year *t-2* to *t-1*] and the subsequent *changes* in non-U.S. firms’ reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers from year *t* to *t+1*. We measure comparability using the adapted DKV measure (*COMP\_US*) and three modified DKV measures (*COMP\_US\_Q*, *COMP\_US\_AS*, and *COMP\_US\_CFO*). Controls in Panel A [Panel B] include the levels of [changes in] the logarithm of market capitalization (*SIZE*), book-to-market ratio (*BM*), return-on-assets ratio (*ROA*), stock return volatility (*RETVOL*), an indicator variable for cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange (*ADR*), firm age (*AGE*), and closely held ownership (*CH*). Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. The regression is estimated using the pooled sample of all non-U.S. firms in Column (1) of both panels, the developed markets subsample in Column (2), and the emerging markets subsample in Columns (3)-(6). We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, year, industry, and country fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA5 – Changes in emerging market firms’ dividend policy surrounding JGTRRA**

| Dependent Variable                            | <i>DIVIDEND</i> <sub><i>t+1</i></sub> |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| <i>POST2003_TaxTreaty</i> <sub><i>t</i></sub> | <b>-0.019</b><br>(0.012)              |
| Controls <sub><i>t</i></sub>                  | Yes                                   |
| Year FE                                       | Yes                                   |
| Firm FE                                       | Yes                                   |
| # of Obs.                                     | 43,732                                |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>                       | 0.6592                                |

This table reports the OLS regression results examining the changes in emerging market firms’ dividend policy (*DIVIDEND*) in year *t+1* using a sample from 2002 to 2005, the four years surrounding the JGTRRA Act of 2003. *POST2003\_TaxTreaty* is a binary variable that denotes tax treaty eligibility in year *t*. We define controls as the control variables used in Table IA4 Panel A. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper and the definition table at the beginning of this Internet Appendix. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, and firm fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA6 – Comparability to U.S. firms and foreign analyst forecast properties, separately for emerging and developed markets**

| <i>Emerging Markets</i>        |  |   |   |
|--------------------------------|--|---|---|
|                                | (1)                                    | (2)                                     | (3)                                     |
| Dependent Variables            | <i>ANALYST N</i> $F_{t+1}$             | <i>ANALYST ERR</i> $F_{t+1}$            | <i>ANALYST DISP</i> $F_{t+1}$           |
| <i>COMP_US<sub>t</sub></i>     | <b>0.005</b> <sup>***</sup><br>(0.001) | <b>-0.010</b> <sup>**</sup><br>(0.003)  | <b>-0.017</b> <sup>***</sup><br>(0.006) |
| <i>ISSUE<sub>t</sub></i>       | 0.021 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.012)          | -0.070 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.039)          | -0.075<br>(0.065)                       |
| <i>LOSS<sub>t</sub></i>        | 0.042 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.013)        | 0.801 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.105)         | 0.815 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.117)         |
| <i>EVOL<sub>t</sub></i>        | 0.222 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.071)        | 0.923 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.343)         | 1.329 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.689)           |
| <i>TURNOVER<sub>t</sub></i>    | -0.016 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.002)       | -0.016 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.007)         | -0.011<br>(0.025)                       |
| <i>R&amp;D<sub>t</sub></i>     | -0.408 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.236)         | -0.407<br>(0.591)                       | -2.328 <sup>**</sup><br>(1.134)         |
| Standard Controls <sub>t</sub> | Yes                                    | Yes                                     | Yes                                     |
| Year FE                        | Yes                                    | Yes                                     | Yes                                     |
| Industry FE                    | Yes                                    | Yes                                     | Yes                                     |
| Country FE                     | Yes                                    | Yes                                     | Yes                                     |
| # of Obs.                      | 53,665                                 | 6,610                                   | 2,398                                   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>        | 0.3794                                 | 0.1496                                  | 0.1996                                  |
| <i>Developed Markets</i>       |  |   |   |
|                                | (1)                                    | (2)                                     | (3)                                     |
| Dependent Variables            | <i>ANALYST N</i> $F_{t+1}$             | <i>ANALYST ERR</i> $F_{t+1}$            | <i>ANALYST DISP</i> $F_{t+1}$           |
| <i>COMP_US<sub>t</sub></i>     | <b>0.006</b> <sup>***</sup><br>(0.001) | <b>-0.010</b> <sup>***</sup><br>(0.002) | <b>-0.021</b> <sup>***</sup><br>(0.005) |
| <i>ISSUE<sub>t</sub></i>       | -0.055 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.009)       | 0.014<br>(0.018)                        | -0.013<br>(0.034)                       |
| <i>LOSS<sub>t</sub></i>        | 0.064 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.008)        | 0.415 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.060)         | 0.871 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.082)         |
| <i>EVOL<sub>t</sub></i>        | 0.059 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.034)          | 0.697 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.305)          | 1.221 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.504)          |
| <i>TURNOVER<sub>t</sub></i>    | 0.044 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.005)        | 0.017<br>(0.044)                        | 0.004<br>(0.031)                        |
| <i>R&amp;D<sub>t</sub></i>     | 0.220 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.092)         | -0.237<br>(0.499)                       | -0.834 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.389)         |
| Controls <sub>t</sub>          | Yes                                    | Yes                                     | Yes                                     |
| Year FE                        | Yes                                    | Yes                                     | Yes                                     |
| Industry FE                    | Yes                                    | Yes                                     | Yes                                     |
| Country FE                     | Yes                                    | Yes                                     | Yes                                     |
| # of Obs.                      | 92,744                                 | 16,531                                  | 6,905                                   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>        | 0.4659                                 | 0.0943                                  | 0.2406                                  |

Top panel [bottom panel] of this table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between the levels of non-U.S. firms' reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers (*COMP\_US*) in year  $t$  and the levels of forecast properties of the foreign analysts following the firms in year  $t+1$ , using the emerging markets subsample [developed markets subsample]. The forecast properties are *ANALYST\_N\_F*, *ANALYST\_ERR\_F*, and *ANALYST\_DISP\_F*. We define controls as the control variables in Table IA4 Panel A, plus the levels of an indicator for a reporting loss (*LOSS*), an indicator for issuing debt or equity (*ISSUE*), the volatility of earnings (*EVOL*), stock turnover (*TURNOVER*), and R&D expenditures (*R&D*) in year  $t$ . Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes

the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, industry, and country fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA7 – The effect of U.S. institutions on comparability to U.S. firms, using float-adjusted U.S. ownership and firm-years with positive U.S. ownership**

| Dependent Variables     | (1)<br>Float-adjusted Ownership       | (2)<br>Positive U.S. ownership only   |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                         | $\Delta COMP_{US_{t,t+1}}$            |                                       |
| $US\_OWN\_FLOAT_t$      | <b>1.342<sup>***</sup></b><br>(0.474) |                                       |
| $US\_OWN_t$             |                                       | <b>1.774<sup>***</sup></b><br>(0.527) |
| Controls <sub>t</sub>   | Yes                                   | Yes                                   |
| Year FE                 | Yes                                   | Yes                                   |
| Industry FE             | Yes                                   | Yes                                   |
| Country FE              | Yes                                   | Yes                                   |
| # of Obs.               | 34,167                                | 21,297                                |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.1034                                | 0.1221                                |

This table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between the levels of U.S. mutual fund ownership ( $US\_OWN$ ) in year  $t$  and the subsequent changes in emerging market firms' reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers ( $COMP\_US$ ) from year  $t$  to  $t+1$ . Column (1) uses the float-adjusted U.S. mutual fund ownership for emerging market firms with non-missing closely-held ownership in year  $t$  and Column (2) uses the emerging market firms with positive U.S. mutual fund ownership in year  $t$ . We define controls as the control variables in Table IA4 Panel A. Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper and the definition table at the beginning of this Internet Appendix. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, industry, and country fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA8 – Additional identification analyses controlling for firm fixed effects, economic similarity, earnings quality, and year-country fixed effects, and removing mandatory IFRS-adopting firm-years**

|                                     | (1)                                   | (2)                                  | (3)                                    | (4)                                  | (5)   |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|---|
|                                     |                                       | Emerging Markets                     |  |                                      | Emerging Markets<br>excluding<br>Mandatory<br>IFRS adopters |
| Dependent Variables                 |                                       |                                      | $\Delta COMP_{US_{t \text{ to } t+1}}$ |                                      |   |
| $US\_OWN_t$                         | <b>2.486<sup>***</sup></b><br>(0.803) | <b>1.269<sup>**</sup></b><br>(0.503) | <b>1.575<sup>**</sup></b><br>(0.666)   | <b>1.170<sup>**</sup></b><br>(0.486) | <b>1.318<sup>**</sup></b><br>(0.551)                        |
| $CORR\_RET_t$                       |                                       | 0.062<br>(0.109)                     |  |                                      |   |
| $CORR\_CFO_t$                       |                                       | 0.699 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.190)      |  |                                      |   |
| $BETA_t$                            |                                       | 0.106 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.034)      |  |                                      |   |
| $ASSETTURN_t$                       |                                       | -0.122 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.034)     |  |                                      |   |
| $FSALES_t$                          |                                       | -0.239 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.098)      |  |                                      |   |
| $OPCYCLE_t$                         |                                       | 0.401 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.101)      | 0.463 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.112)        |                                      |   |
| $\Delta AQ_{t \text{ to } t+1}$     |                                       |                                      | -3.500 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.483)       |                                      |   |
| $\Delta SMOOTH_{t \text{ to } t+1}$ |                                       |                                      | -0.167 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.063)       |                                      |   |
| $LOSS_t$                            |                                       |                                      | -0.434 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.076)       |                                      |   |
| $SALES\_GR_{t-1 \text{ to } t}$     |                                       |                                      | 0.117 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.063)          |                                      |   |
| Controls <sub>t</sub>               | Yes                                   | Yes                                  | Yes                                    | Yes                                  | Yes   |
| Year FE                             | Yes                                   | Yes                                  | Yes                                    | Yes                                  | Yes   |
| Industry FE                         | No                                    | Yes                                  | Yes                                    | Yes                                  | Yes   |
| Country FE                          | No                                    | Yes                                  | Yes                                    | Yes                                  | Yes   |
| Firm FE                             | Yes                                   | No                                   | No                                     | No                                   | No  |
| Country×Year FE                     | Yes                                   | No                                   | No                                     | Yes                                  | No  |
| # of Obs.                           | 51,601                                | 36,409                               | 35,490                                 | 51,601                               | 47,273  |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>             | 0.1373                                | 0.1240                               | 0.1192                                 | 0.1406                               | 0.0975  |

This table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between the levels of U.S. mutual fund ownership ( $US\_OWN$ ) in year  $t$  and the subsequent changes in emerging market firms' reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers ( $COMP\_US$ ) from year  $t$  to  $t+1$ . Column (1) replaces industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects. Column (2) includes six additional controls for economic similarity. Column (3) includes two controls for contemporaneous changes in earnings quality as well as three additional controls for the fundamental determinants of earnings quality. Column (4) controls for country-year fixed effects. Column (5) removes firm-years during which the IFRS adoption was mandatory. We define controls as the control variables in Table IA4 Panel A. Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes the change in a variable as

indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper and the definition table at the beginning of this Internet Appendix. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, industry, country, and firm fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA9 – Additional identification analyses controlling for lagged comparability and using change in comparability measured over longer horizons**

|                         | (1)                        | (2)                       | (3)                       | (4)                        | (5)                       |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
|                         | $\Delta COMP\_US$          | $\Delta COMP\_US$         | $\Delta COMP\_US$         | $\Delta COMP\_US$          | $\Delta COMP\_US$         |
| Dependent Variables     | $t$ to $t+1$               | $t$ to $t+2$              | $t$ to $t+3$              | $t$ to $t+4$               | $t$ to $t+5$              |
| $US\_OWN_t$             | <b>1.148***</b><br>(0.409) | <b>2.126**</b><br>(1.001) | <b>2.959**</b><br>(1.421) | <b>4.843***</b><br>(1.806) | <b>4.449**</b><br>(2.255) |
| $COMP\_US_t$            | -0.169***<br>(0.004)       |                           |                           |                            |                           |
| Controls $_t$           | Yes                        | Yes                       | Yes                       | Yes                        | Yes                       |
| Year FE                 | Yes                        | Yes                       | Yes                       | Yes                        | Yes                       |
| Industry FE             | Yes                        | Yes                       | Yes                       | Yes                        | Yes                       |
| Country FE              | Yes                        | Yes                       | Yes                       | Yes                        | Yes                       |
| # of Obs.               | 51,601                     | 43,624                    | 36,415                    | 30,003                     | 24,247                    |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.1772                     | 0.1277                    | 0.1508                    | 0.1695                     | 0.1757                    |

This table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between the levels of U.S. mutual fund ownership ( $US\_OWN$ ) in year  $t$  and the subsequent changes in emerging market firms' reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers ( $COMP\_US$ ). The change in comparability is measured from year  $t$  to  $t+n$  in Column ( $n$ ), with  $n=1, 2, 3, 4,$  and  $5$ . Column (1) includes the level of comparability  $COMP\_US$  in year  $t$  as an additional control. We define controls as the control variables in Table IA4 Panel A. Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, industry, and country fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA10 – The effect of U.S. ownership initiation on comparability to U.S. firms**

|   | (1)                      | (2)                     | (3)                                    | (4)                                   | (5)                                    |
|---|--------------------------|-------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|
|   | $\Delta COMP\_US$        | $\Delta COMP\_US$       | $\Delta COMP\_US$                      | $\Delta COMP\_US$                     | $\Delta COMP\_US$                      |
| Dependent Variables                         | $t$ to $t+1$             | $t$ to $t+2$            | $t$ to $t+3$                           | $t$ to $t+4$                          | $t$ to $t+5$                           |
| $INITIATION_t$                              | <b>-0.031</b><br>(0.072) | <b>0.073</b><br>(0.113) | <b>0.410</b> <sup>***</sup><br>(0.156) | <b>0.433</b> <sup>**</sup><br>(0.201) | <b>0.721</b> <sup>***</sup><br>(0.228) |
| $\Delta$ Controls <sub><math>t</math></sub> | Yes                      | Yes                     | Yes                                    | Yes                                   | Yes                                    |
| Year FE                                     | Yes                      | Yes                     | Yes                                    | Yes                                   | Yes                                    |
| Industry FE                                 | Yes                      | Yes                     | Yes                                    | Yes                                   | Yes                                    |
| Country FE                                  | Yes                      | Yes                     | Yes                                    | Yes                                   | Yes                                    |
| # of Obs.                                   | 48,490                   | 40,722                  | 33,662                                 | 27,376                                | 21,707                                 |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>                     | 0.0730                   | 0.0873                  | 0.1066                                 | 0.1270                                | 0.1467                                 |

This table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between the levels of U.S. mutual fund ownership ( $US\_OWN$ ) in year  $t$  and the subsequent changes in emerging market firms' reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers ( $COMP\_US$ ). The change in comparability is measured from year  $t$  to  $t+n$  in Column ( $n$ ), with  $n=1, 2, 3, 4,$  and  $5$ . We define controls as the control variables in Table IA4 Panel A. Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper and the definition table at the beginning of this Internet Appendix. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, industry, and country fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA11 – The effect of U.K. institutions on comparability to U.K. firms**

| Dependent Variables          | (1)                     | (2)                      |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| $UK\_OWN_t$                  | <b>0.241</b><br>(0.787) | <b>1.417*</b><br>(0.807) |
| Controls <sub><i>t</i></sub> | Yes                     | Yes                      |
| Year FE                      | Yes                     | Yes                      |
| Industry FE                  | Yes                     | Yes                      |
| Country FE                   | Yes                     | Yes                      |
| # of Obs.                    | 51,715                  | 11,742                   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>      | 0.0864                  | 0.1468                   |

This table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between the levels of U.K. mutual fund ownership ( $UK\_OWN$ ) in year  $t$  and the subsequent changes in emerging market firms' reporting comparability to their U.K. industry peers ( $COMP\_UK$ ) from year  $t$  to  $t+1$ . Column (1) uses the entire emerging markets subsample and Column (2) includes only the emerging market firms with positive U.K. mutual fund ownership in year  $t$ . We define controls as the control variables in Table IA4 Panel A. Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper and the definition table at the beginning of this Internet Appendix. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, industry, and country fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA12 – Cross-sectional analyses based on institutions’ characteristics**

| Dependent Variables                                       | (1)             | (2)          | (3)             | (4)          | (5)            | (6)          |
|---|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|
|   | $\Delta COMP$   | $US_{t,t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP$   | $US_{t,t+1}$ | $\Delta COMP$  | $US_{t,t+1}$ |
| $US\_OWN_t$   | <b>1.313***</b> |              |                 |              |                |              |
|   | (0.501)         |              |                 |              |                |              |
| $NONUS\_OWN_t$  |                 | <b>0.596</b> |                 |              |                |              |
|   |                 | (0.433)      |                 |              |                |              |
| $US\_BLKOWN_t$  |                 |              | <b>2.256***</b> |              |                |              |
|   |                 |              | (0.725)         |              |                |              |
| $US\_NONBLKOWN_t$   |                 |              |                 | <b>0.273</b> |                |              |
|   |                 |              |                 | (0.786)      |                |              |
| $US\_LTOWN_t$   |                 |              |                 |              | <b>1.596**</b> |              |
|   |                 |              |                 |              | (0.626)        |              |
| $US\_STOWN_t$   |                 |              |                 |              |                | <b>0.996</b> |
|   |                 |              |                 |              |                | (0.822)      |
| <i>P-value of the difference in coefficient estimates</i> |                 | <b>0.03</b>  |                 | <b>0.01</b>  |                | <b>0.08</b>  |
| Controls <sub><i>t</i></sub>                              | Yes             | Yes          | Yes             | Yes          | Yes            | Yes          |
| Year FE   | Yes             | Yes          | Yes             | Yes          | Yes            | Yes          |
| Industry FE   | Yes             | Yes          | Yes             | Yes          | Yes            | Yes          |
| Country FE  | Yes             | Yes          | Yes             | Yes          | Yes            | Yes          |
| # of Obs.   | 51,601          | 51,601       | 51,601          | 51,601       | 51,601         | 51,601       |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>                                   | 0.0941          | 0.0940       | 0.0942          | 0.0939       | 0.0941         | 0.0940       |

This table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between the levels of different types of foreign mutual fund ownership in year  $t$  and the subsequent changes in emerging market firms’ reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers ( $COMP\_US$ ) from year  $t$  to  $t+1$ . The different types of foreign mutual fund ownership include the ownership by foreign non-U.S. institutions ( $NONUS\_OWN$ ), by foreign blockholders ( $US\_BLKOWN$ ), by foreign non-blockholders ( $US\_NONBLKOWN$ ), by foreign long-term holders ( $US\_LTOWN$ ), and by foreign short-term holder ( $US\_STOWN$ ). We define controls as the control variables in Table IA4 Panel A. Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper and the definition table at the beginning of this Internet Appendix. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, industry, and country fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.

**Table IA13 – Cross-sectional analyses based on countries’ legal origin**

|                           | (1)                                  | (2)                                | (3)                                 | (4)                               |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                           | Developed<br>Common Law<br>Countries | Developed<br>Code Law<br>Countries | Emerging<br>Common Law<br>Countries | Emerging<br>Code Law<br>Countries |
| Dependent Variables       |                                      |                                    |                                     |                                   |
| $US\_OWN_t$               | <b>0.053</b><br>(0.502)              | <b>-0.289</b><br>(0.328)           | <b>-0.528</b><br>(1.101)            | <b>1.802***</b><br>(0.565)        |
| $\Delta COMP\_US_{t,t+1}$ |                                      |                                    |                                     |                                   |
| Controls <sub>t</sub>     | Yes                                  | Yes                                | Yes                                 | Yes                               |
| Year FE                   | Yes                                  | Yes                                | Yes                                 | Yes                               |
| Industry FE               | Yes                                  | Yes                                | Yes                                 | Yes                               |
| Country FE                | Yes                                  | Yes                                | Yes                                 | Yes                               |
| # of Obs.                 | 36,338                               | 52,588                             | 17,548                              | 34,053                            |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>   | 0.0764                               | 0.0990                             | 0.1287                              | 0.0782                            |

This table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between the levels of U.S. mutual fund ownership ( $US\_OWN$ ) in year  $t$  and the subsequent changes in emerging market firms’ reporting comparability to their U.S. industry peers ( $COMP\_US$ ) from year  $t$  to  $t+1$ . Column (1) uses the developed, common law markets, Column (2) uses the developed, code law markets, Column (3) uses the emerging, common law markets, and Column (4) uses the emerging, code law markets. We define controls as the control variables in Table IA4 Panel A. Prefix  $\Delta$  denotes the change in a variable as indicated by its subscripts. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is between 1998 and 2009. We do not report coefficient estimates on intercepts, controls, year, industry, and country fixed effects for brevity. # of Obs. denotes the number of observations. We report standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm, in parentheses. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.